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The Past and Future of 
Constitutional Law and Social 
Justice: Majestic or Substantive 
Equality? 
David Wiseman* 
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to 
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread. 
~ Anatole France, The Red Lily1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Canadian society is characterized by significant and growing socio-
economic inequality that forms part of a broader landscape of persistent 
social injustice. There are regular calls for governmental action to 
address poverty and other social and economic disadvantages. The issue 
I consider in this article is to what extent the Constitution of Canada,2 
including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 might play a role, over 
the longer term, in alleviating socio-economic inequality. Put more 
briefly, what are the prospects for advancing social justice through 
constitutional law over the long term?  
                                                                                                                       
*  Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law (Common Law Section (English)), University of 
Ottawa. I wish to thank the organizers, Professors Sonia Lawrence and Benjamin Berger, of the 18th 
Annual Constitutional Cases Conference (April, 2015), at which an earlier version of this article was 
presented.  I also wish to thank Bruce Porter, Martha Jackman and the anonymous reviewer for valuable 
comments on earlier versions. Finally, thanks to Brad Yaeger for excellent research assistance, funded 
in part via the Law Foundation of Ontario Fellowships program. 
1  First published in 1894. As quoted in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. 
Saskatchewan, [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245, 2015 SCC 4, per Abella J., at para. 56 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saskatchewan”]. 
2  Constitution Act, 1982, enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c.11, s. 1,  reprinted in R.S.C. 
1985, Appendix II, No. 5 [hereinafter “Constitution”]. 
3  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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For the purposes of this article, the ideal of “social justice” is thus 
understood as primarily concerned with the eradication of socio-economic 
inequality. To be clear, in the present context, a distinction is drawn 
between socio-economic difference and socio-economic inequality, with 
the distinction being that the former is a descriptive label, whereas the 
latter is a normative concept involving notions of unjustifiable disadvantage 
and discrimination. Consequently, not all circumstances of socio-economic 
difference will necessarily amount to socio-economic inequality and, 
indeed, some circumstances of socio-economic sameness may not ensure 
socio-economic equality.4 Further, this article also distinguishes between 
a substantive conception of socio-economic equality and a merely formal 
or, in the words of Anatole France, “majestic” conception of socio-
economic equality. In fact, since it can be argued that it is the very 
concern for the socio-economic dimension of equality, as opposed to the 
more traditional civil and political dimensions, that distinguishes substantive 
equality from formal/majestic equality, there is a degree of redundancy 
to the use of the “socio-economic” qualifier when distinguishing these 
conceptions of equality. Therefore, in the context of this article, the key 
distinction between these conceptions of equality is that the formal 
version  which is often defined as “treat likes alike”  focuses on a 
need to address differential treatment in law, whereas the substantive 
version acknowledges a need to address differential social and economic 
circumstances in society. Of course, differential treatment in law can 
often create, reinforce or exacerbate differential social and economic 
circumstances, and so substantive equality can overlap with or 
incorporate the demands of formal equality. However, substantive 
equality transcends formal equality at the point where it demands differential 
legal treatment in order to ameliorate and overcome inequalities in social 
and economic circumstances.5 France’s ironic aphorism masterfully captures 
these contrasting conceptions by juxtaposing the social circumstances and 
                                                                                                                       
4  For discussion of the notions of social justice, socio-economic inequality and substantive 
equality, and the relationships between them, in the context of constitutional law under the Charter, 
see Bruce Porter, “Expectations of Equality” (2006) 33 S.C.L.R. (2d) 23 [hereinafter “Porter”]; and 
Margot Young, “Social Justice and the Charter: Comparison and Choice” (2013) 50 Osgoode Hall 
L.J. 669 [hereinafter “Young, ‘Social Justice’”] and “Unequal to the Task: Kapp’ing the Substantive 
Potential of Section 15” [hereinafter “Young, ‘Kapp’ing’”] in Sanda Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre, 
eds., The Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, Retrenchment or Retreat 
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2010). 
5  By the same token, it should be noted that some versions of formal equality  those 
that meaningfully acknowledge the need to not only treat likes alike but also to “treat un-alikes  
un-alikely”  can potentially incorporate some of the demands for substantive equality. 
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legal treatment of the rich and poor. The law’s identical treatment, 
prohibiting both from sleeping rough, pan-handling or stealing, accords 
with formal equality. Yet it ignores the fact that only the poor may be 
driven by their disadvantaged social and economic circumstances to 
pursue such desperate survival measures. The result is a hollow equality 
 it has a formal majesty, but it is not meaningful to the lived reality of 
poverty. Substantive equality notices this contrast and asks for a legal 
response that addresses social and economic disadvantage in order to 
protect people against the need to act so desperately. Writ larger, the 
demands of substantive equality can be regarded as the social justice 
aspiration of social democracies like Canada. In turn, the question of 
what the prospects are for advancing social justice through constitutional 
law over the long term can be understood as the question of to what 
extent constitutional law promotes socio-economic equality or, in other 
words, substantive equality. Given the close association being posited 
between these three terms (i.e., social justice, socio-economic equality 
and substantive equality), they will be used somewhat interchangeably. 
Lacking a crystal ball, I initially take a “back-to-the-future” approach 
to that question by reviewing the role of constitutional law over the past 
three decades or so. My review indicates that at particular moments, and in 
particular ways, constitutional law can be either positively or negatively 
involved in the action and inaction of governments in relation to socio-
economic inequality and social injustice. This review supports the first part 
of my argument in this article, which is that, cumulatively, and over the 
longer term, the role of constitutional law has been predominantly one of 
facilitating substantive equality. By describing its role as facilitative 
I mean that constitutional law has not generally blocked governmental 
action addressing social injustice and, instead, has generally tended to 
enable or validate it. So, generally speaking, when governments have chosen 
to use legal measures to improve substantive equality, constitutional law has 
generally facilitated that choice by upholding the constitutionality of those 
legal measures. However, at the same time, constitutional law has been 
decidedly reluctant to compel governments to alleviate socio-economic 
inequality or to otherwise protect or advance social justice, and it has often 
refused to stop governments from exacerbating inequality and injustice. 
Although there are some bright spots, especially under the Charter, where 
constitutional law has forced or protected some substantive equality 
measures, judicial support for substantive equality has generally been 
restrained and cautious. In my view, looking ahead, and especially given 
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current socio-economic trends, while facilitative constitutional law is 
good, it is not good enough. This leads me to the second part of my 
argument, which is that, for constitutional law to play a more meaningful 
role in advancing substantive equality and social justice in the decades 
ahead, a key element of constitutional law under the Charter will need to 
change. Specifically, I argue that the judicial approach to concerns over the 
social policy complexity of substantive equality claims under the Charter 
is in danger of trapping those claims between a rock and a hard place and, 
in so doing, denying constitutional law the potential to move beyond 
merely facilitating social justice to a more meaningful role of protecting 
and compelling it. What is needed, I argue, is a new approach to 
acknowledging and managing the social policy complexity of substantive 
equality claims. 
This article has three parts. In Part II, I provide a brief overview of some 
indicators of socio-economic inequality in Canada. In Part III, I review the 
past three decades or so of constitutional law in relation to government 
action and inaction on social justice and substantive equality. This review 
includes, but is not limited to, the role of the Charter. In Part IV, I identify 
and consider the problem of social policy complexity, and responses to it, as 
an element of constitutional law under the Charter that will need to be 
addressed if constitutional law is to play a more meaningful role in 
protecting and advancing substantive equality in the coming decades.  
II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN CANADA 
For many decades Canadian governments have pursued social welfare 
policies that have provided a significant degree of both universal and 
targeted socio-economic support, and that have therefore played an 
important role in addressing substantive inequality.6 Yet, as will be 
discussed in this part, Canadian society is still marked by persistently 
significant levels of poverty and by increasing levels of socio-economic 
inequality. The detrimental impact of significant poverty on individuals 
and groups has been known and documented for some time. Individuals and 
groups who experience poverty also disproportionately experience adverse 
socio-economic circumstances and outcomes. In other words, it is well 
                                                                                                                       
6  For example, social assistance and unemployment insurance programs. For an historical 
overview of the establishment and development of these and other governmental initiatives, see 
Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 3d ed. (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1997). 
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recognized that absolute levels of income deprivation translate into unequal 
adverse socio-economic outcomes. More recently though, attention is being 
paid to how relative levels of income inequality generate their own distinct 
detriments, both to those individuals and groups who are relatively deprived 
and to the broader societies within which they live.7 Income inequality is now 
understood to compound the detriment caused by income deprivation. In 
what follows in this part I provide a brief overview of the situations of both 
poverty and income inequality in Canada, while also noting the ongoing 
capacity of Canadian governments to influence these situations through their 
policy choices. I conclude this section with a brief observation on the 
significance of this for a constitutional conception of substantive equality. 
In terms of poverty, a Statistics Canada research paper on low-income 
incidence produced in 2012 reported a Canadian low-income rate of 13 per 
cent in 1976 and 11.7 per cent in 2009,8 with an average incidence of 12.6 
per cent over the period. This is despite the fact that, over the same basic 
period (1975 to 2013), Canada’s gross domestic product (“GDP”) grew by 
almost 1,000 per cent, from $173.5 billion to $1.8 trillion.9 There is no 
question that social welfare or, as they are referred to by the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), “social 
protection” policies, play a significant role in ensuring that the incidence of 
low-income in Canada is not worse. In 2013, social protection expenditure 
across the nine categories monitored by the OECD totalled 17.4 per cent of 
Canada’s GDP.10 Through these types of expenditures, and other 
redistributive measures, the Gini coefficient measure of income inequality 
in Canada in 2011 for the aggregate of family units was reduced from 
0.436 to 0.313.11 Moreover, governments have had success with policy 
                                                                                                                       
7  A widely-known recent argument of this nature is provided in R. Wilkinson & K. Pickett, 
The Spirit Level (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010) [hereinafter “Wilkinson & Pickett”]. 
8  Brian Murphy, Xuelin Zhang & Claude Dionne, Low Income in Canada: a Multi-line 
and Multi-index Perspective (2012), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75f0002m/ 75f0002m2012001-
eng.pdf> [hereinafter “StatsCan”]. These figures are the annual average of the three measures of  
low-income maintained by Statistics Canada: the Low Income Measure (which calculates the 
proportion of the population whose income is 50 per cent or less of the median adjusted national 
income); the Low-Income Cut-Off (which calculates the threshold income below which a family is 
likely to devote a larger share of its income to the necessities of food, shelter and clothing than the 
average family); and the Market Basket Measure (which calculates the threshold income needed to 
purchase a specific basket of goods representing basic living standards). 
9  The World Bank, “GDP (Current US$)”, online: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries/CA?display=graph>. 
10  OECD Databank, online: <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG>. 
11  The Gini coefficient is a measure for income inequality. The Gini is zero if everyone has 
the same income and is one if a single person has all the income. Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 
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choices that have prioritized reducing poverty among particular groups. 
For example, reducing poverty among older adults has been a particular 
priority and concerted policy attention has produced a long-term decrease 
in incidence of low-income among this group  from 21 per cent in 1981 
to just over 5 per cent in 2010.12 On the other hand, groups who have not 
been prioritized, such as recent immigrants, off-reserve Aboriginal people, 
persons living with disabilities, and unattached individuals under 65, have 
seen their incidence of low income barely improve or, for the last of these 
groups, become somewhat worse, over this period. The relationship 
between governmental policy choices and low-income incidence is attested 
to in Figure 1, below, which charts five categories of Canadian social 
protection expenditure, as a proportion of GDP, from 1980 to 2013. As can 
be seen, expenditure in the “old age” category has risen over one 
percentage point over the period, whereas expenditure in the “social 
assistance” category has barely risen over half a percentage point, and 
expenditure in the “unemployment” and “housing” categories has fallen.  
 
Figure 1: Figure produced with data obtained from OECD Library, 
“Social Expenditure - Aggregated Data”, obtained May 2015, online: 
<https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SOCX_AGG#>.  
The effects of persistent poverty and income deprivation are well 
known. A review of Canadian literature relevant to the issue of the social 
                                                                                                                       
202-0709, online: <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&retrLang=eng&id=2020709& 
pattern=202-0701..202-0709&tabMode=dataTable&srchLan=-1&p1=-1&p2=31>. 
12  Citizens for Public Justice, Poverty Trends Scorecard (2012), at 6, online: 
<http://www.cpj.ca/files/docs/poverty-trends-scorecard.pdf>. 
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consequences of economic inequality for Canadian children concluded that 
there is a “strong relationship between low income and/or socio-economic 
status and deleterious social outcomes”.13 The social outcomes where 
detriment was evident included: likelihood of physical, sexual and emotional 
victimization; incidence of lower academic/cognitive educational 
achievement and undesirable social/behavioural activity; lower life 
expectancy, risk of illness and other emotional and physical health 
experiences; and employment outcomes. Moreover, given the over-
representation of women, new immigrants, racialized populations and 
people living with disabilities among the lower income strata, these 
detrimental social outcomes are disproportionately borne by these groups.14  
In Part IV of this article, I will be referring to a Charter claim that 
Canadian governments have failed to protect people against homelessness 
and inadequate housing. Specific statistics in this area are alarming. For 
example, it is estimated that approximately 35,000 people are homeless on 
any given night and that over 235,000 people experience homelessness in a 
year.15 It is also estimated that nearly one in five renter households 
experience extreme housing affordability problems, defined as being on 
low income and spending more than 50 per cent of income on rent.16 Less 
extreme affordability problems, defined by Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation as spending more than 30 per cent of income on rent or 
similar housing costs (i.e., a mortgage), affect nearly half of all renter 
households and nearly 20 per cent of owner households. The situations of 
both homelessness and precarious housing have known detrimental 
impacts on individual’s physical and mental health, as well as other social 
outcomes, and this has been recognized by Canadian courts.17 Households 
that have to spend a high proportion of income on rent often do not have 
sufficient funds for other basic necessities, such as food. Food bank use has 
                                                                                                                       
13  Canadian Council on Learning, The Social Consequences of Economic Inequality for Canadian 
Children: A Review of the Canadian Literature (2006), online: <www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/research/ 
social_consequences2.pdf>. 
14  See StatsCan, supra, note 8 generally. See also Meyer Burstein, “Combatting the Social 
Exclusion of At-Risk Groups”, Policy Research Initiative (2005), at 7, online: <http://dspace. 
africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/23099/1/Combatting%20the%20Social%20Exclusion%20of%20
At%20Risk%20Groups.pdf?1>. 
15  Stephen Gaetz, Tanya Gulliver & Tim Richter, The State of Homelessness in Canada 
2014 (Toronto: The Homeless Hub Press, 2014), at 5. 
16  Id. 
17  See Victoria (City) v. Adams, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1538, 95 B.C.L.R. (4th) 175, 2009 BCSC 
1043, at para. 18 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 100 B.C.L.R. (4th) 28, 2009 BCCA 563 
(B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Adams”]. 
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climbed steadily and significantly in Canada over the past two decades, with 
2012 seeing a record number of 872,379 people using a food bank during 
the annual counting month of March.18 The number decreased to 833,098 
for 2013, but then climbed to 841,191 for 2014.19 The March 2014 count 
represents an increase in usage of 25 per cent over March 2008, which was 
the last year of a periodic downward trend in food bank use that ended with 
the 2008-09 global recession.20 
The disproportionate detrimental circumstances and outcomes 
produced by absolute levels of poverty and low-income, such as precarious 
housing and food insecurity, are then compounded by the detrimental 
impact of relative income inequality. Although social protection 
expenditure and other redistributive measures perform a significant 
ameliorative function on the degree of income inequality in Canada, 
Canadian society is now materially more income-unequal than it was in 
the mid-1970s. As shown in Figure 2, below, after declining steadily, if 
erratically, between 1975 and 1989, Canada’s Gini coefficient rose steadily 
until around 2005, and has since remained at a similar level. Over the same 
period, Canada’s gross national income per capita has risen steadily.  
 
Figure 2: Figure prepared using data obtained from Statistics Canada, 
CANSIM Table 202-0705, “Gini coefficients of market, total and after-tax 
income, by economic family type” obtained May 2015; and from United 
Nations Statistics Division, “Per Capita GNI at Current U.S. Prices” 
obtained May 2015.  
The way in which income inequality in Canada has increased is 
probably not surprising. The share of total income for the richest 20 per cent 
                                                                                                                       
18  Food Banks Canada, Hunger Count 2012 (Toronto: Food Banks Canada, 2012). 
19  Food Banks Canada, Hunger Count 2014 (Toronto: Food Banks Canada, 2014). 
20  Id. 
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of the population has been steadily increasing since the early 1980s  from 
43 per cent to 47.3 per cent. This has come at the expense of both the middle 
40 per cent of income earners and the lower 40 per cent group, whose shares 
have fallen by around 2 per cent each.21  
The apparent lack of relationship between economic growth and 
more equal income distribution, as well as the persistence and impact of 
income inequality itself, have become subjects of investigation in recent 
economic literature. For instance, in The Spirit Level, a study that quickly 
drew attention, one conclusion reached by authors Wilkinson and Pickett 
is that as GDP per capita reaches the relatively affluent range of $30,000 
(which it did in Canada in 2004), improvements in societal well-being 
become more closely related to income distribution than economic 
growth.22 Wilkinson and Pickett also found a very close and direct 
correlation between increased incidence of a variety of social problems  
including loss of social trust and collaborative relations  and the high 
levels of income inequality in developed countries.23 Similarly, the 
Canadian Index of Wellbeing (“CIW”) reported that although Canadian 
GDP grew by 28.9 per cent from 1994 to 2010, a measure of the (objective) 
well-being of Canadians grew by only 5.7 per cent in the same period.24 The 
authors partly attributed the slower increase in well-being to increasing 
socio-economic inequality over the period. In addition, the CIW reported 
that, during the recession of 2008 to 2010, while GDP declined 8.3 per 
cent, well-being declined 24 per cent.25 More broadly, research by the 
International Monetary Fund has concluded that economic growth is 
                                                                                                                       
21  Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 202-0405, “Upper income limits and income shares of 
total income quintiles, by economic family type, 2011 constant dollars”, online: 
<http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2020405>. 
22  Wilkinson & Pickett, supra, note 7, at 8. 
23  Id., at 6. 
24  Canadian Index of Wellbeing, How are Canadians Really Doing? (Waterloo, Ont.:  
CIW and University of Waterloo, 2012), at 1, online: <https://uwaterloo.ca/canadian-index-
wellbeing/sites/ca.canadian-index-wellbeing/files/uploads/files/CIW2012-HowAreCanadiansReallyDoing-
23Oct2012_0.pdf>. The results of the CIW are echoed in the results of a global study of subjective 
happiness, see John Helliwell, Richard Layard & Jeffrey Sacks eds., World Happiness Report 2013 
(New York: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2013). In the WHR, Canada ranked 6th in 
the world and was topped only by Switzerland (3rd) and a collection of Northern European countries 
(Denmark (1st), Norway (2nd), Netherlands (4th), Sweden (5th)). Nevertheless, the WHR also recognizes 
that happiness inequality exists in Canada. In fact, the WHR finds that over the five years since the 
previous report, although overall happiness is at a similar level in Canada, inequality of happiness has 
increased. The increase in inequality of happiness echoes increases in socio-economic inequality over the 
same period and, indeed, further back. 
25  Id., at 10. 
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generally more sustainable when income distributions are more 
equalized.26 
The idea that income inequality is a problem in its own right puts the 
task of defining a constitutional conception of equality in a new light. To 
the extent that constitutional law seeks to protect and advance 
substantive equality in the socio-economic realm, this idea means that 
constitutional law needs to be concerned not only with the relationship 
between inequality of socio-economic conditions and income deprivation 
but also with the relationship between adverse socio-economic 
conditions and income inequality. Constitutional law needs to pay 
attention to the policy choices of Canadian governments in relation to 
both the floor of socio-economic well-being and the distance between the 
floor and the ceiling of socio-economic well-being. In considering the 
role of constitutional law in relation to socio-economic inequality, it also 
bears re-emphasizing that, although the degree of socio-economic 
inequality in Canada is clearly influenced by regional and international 
economics and other events, and although the causes and impacts of 
those events are to a significant extent beyond the control of domestic 
governments, the policy choices of Canadian governments nevertheless 
remain relevant. This is evident in a negative way in the fact that the 
general worsening of income inequality in Canada since the mid-1990s 
corresponds with a significant retrenchment in Canadian social programs 
brought about through the erosion and eventual elimination of the 
Canada Assistance Plan.27 But it is also evident in a positive way, as 
evident in the relative success of the deliberate and concerted policy 
action taken on poverty among older adults. More recently, the final 
report on a large scale trial of so-called Housing First strategies across 
five Canadian locations has shown significant improvement in the life 
circumstances of the homeless persons who participated, along with 
significant cost savings to society, as compared to “treatment-as-usual”.28 
The persistence of income deprivation and income inequality in Canada 
is thus in part attributable to the choices that Canadian governments 
make as to what policy actions and interventions they will undertake. 
                                                                                                                       
26  Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, “Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides of 
the Same Coin?”, IMF Research Department (2011), at 3, online: <https://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1108.pdf>. See also, Broadbent Institute, Towards a More Equal Canada: A Report 
on Canada’s Economic and Social Inequality (Ottawa: Broadbent Institute, 2012), online: 
<http://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/towards_a_more_equal_canada>. 
27  See discussion below, Part III.1. 
28  Paula Goering et al., National At Home/Chez Soi Final Report (Calgary: Mental Health 
Commission of Canada, 2014), online: <http://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/English/node/24376>. 
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Since constitutional law plays a fundamental role in regulating those 
choices, it also has the potential to play a role in the prevalence of socio-
economic inequality in Canada. In the next part I move to an overview of 
the role that constitutional law has played over the past few decades.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: LOOKING BACK 
The Canadian Constitution and Charter of Rights and Freedoms are 
the foundational infrastructure for the exercise of public legal authority. 
The constitutional law that emanates from them covers a range of 
fundamental aspects of democratic governance. The areas of 
constitutional law that have had greatest relevance to social justice are: 
the identification and division of powers between different levels of 
government (under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution); the definition 
and jurisdictions of the different branches of government, including the 
separation of powers (under Parts III, IV and VII of the Constitution); 
and, the enumeration (and implication) of the fundamental principles, 
rights and freedoms that all branches and levels of government must 
respect, including Aboriginal rights (under section 35 of the 
Constitution) and those guaranteed by the Charter. I will address the 
relationship between constitutional law and social justice in each of these 
areas. 
1.  Division of Powers 
The division of powers in Canada has played a facilitative role in 
relation to governmental action on substantive equality and social justice. 
At a general level, the constitutional provisions that identify and allocate 
governmental powers between the federal and provincial layers of 
government include ample power to regulate socio-economic activity and 
to implement programs to address substantive inequality. The language 
of the constitutional division of powers reserves some areas of socio-
economic policy to one layer of government or the other and so, at times, 
a federal or provincial government may find itself somewhat restricted in 
those areas, but it is never the case that neither layer of government can 
act.29 Moreover, constitutional law has rejected the idea that the division 
                                                                                                                       
29  Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2005), at 
part 15.9(e) [hereinafter “Hogg”]. 
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of powers creates “watertight compartments”30 and so, due to the multi-
dimensional nature of many social justice issues, it is often the case that 
both the federal and provincial governments can act in the same areas, 
even though they may technically need to be targeting different 
dimensions of the same area, in accordance with the differences between 
their available heads of power. For instance, while health care is 
regarded as an area of provincial jurisdiction, the federal government’s 
power over criminal law enables it to actively regulate many activities  
such as abortion services31 or drug addiction treatment32  that have 
both health and criminal/moral dimensions and that also implicate issues 
of socio-economic inequality. At the same time though, constitutional 
law includes doctrines relating to federal paramountcy and 
interjurisdictional immunity that can sometimes thwart the plans of one 
or other layer of government when seeking to act in an area of mutual 
attraction.33  
At a more specific level, constitutional law has played a particularly 
facilitative role through sanctioning conditional and unconditional 
federal spending in areas that ostensibly lie outside the scope of powers 
granted to the federal government. Although the Constitution contains no 
explicit “spending power”, it is taken as a matter of implied 
constitutional necessity that the federal government has the authority to 
spend the money it legitimately raises from taxes and other sources.34 
                                                                                                                       
30  Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326, [1937] 1 
D.L.R. 673 (P.C.). 
31  R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at para. 191 (S.C.C.). 
32  Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, at para. 52 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”]. 
33  For instance, the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity has meant that federal 
jurisdiction over the so-called federally-regulated undertakings identified in s. 92(10)(a) of the 
Constitution has led to provincial minimum wage provisions being rendered inapplicable to 
companies operating in those industries because such provisions intrude on a “vital part” of the 
management and operation of such undertakings: see, Quebec (Commission du Salaire Minimum) v. 
Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966] S.C.J. No. 51, [1966] S.C.R. 767 (S.C.C.). Nevertheless, the 
federal government has the legislative power to set minimum wages of employees of those 
companies (as it did subsequently to the Commission du Salaire Minimum case). For provincial 
intrusions that affected less “vital parts” of federally-regulated undertakings, the doctrine of 
paramountcy of federal legislation would mean that inconsistent federal regulation would also render 
the provincial intrusions inapplicable. 
34  Hogg contends that a basic spending power “must be inferred from the powers to levy 
taxes (s. 91(3)), to legislate in relation to ‘public property’ (s. 91(1A)), and to appropriate federal 
funds (s. 106)”. See Hogg, supra, note 29, at part 6.8(a). Doctrinally, the first judicial confirmation 
of the existence of the spending power has been attributed to Lord Atkin in Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] J.C.J. No. 6, [1937] A.C. 355, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 684, 
at 5 (P.C.). Lord Atkin appeared to set limits to the scope of the power that now seem to have been 
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The more contentious issue is whether this power should be regarded as 
limited to the subject-matters of law-making assigned to the federal 
government under the division of powers.35 This issue potentially 
impacts a wide array of cost-sharing and cost-contribution agreements 
between the federal and provincial governments in areas that directly 
implicate socio-economic equality and social justice. The prime example 
is federal spending on provincial social assistance programs. The 
provision of social assistance is generally regarded as a matter of 
provincial jurisdiction.36 When initiated in the form of the Canada 
Assistance Plan Act (the “CAP”),37 in 1966, federal government spending  
in this area occurred through an agreement to an uncapped 50/50 cost-
sharing arrangement that included conditions on various aspects of the 
programs for which cost-sharing was offered. The conditions included, 
for example, that the level of benefits provided under social assistance 
programs take account of the costs of basic necessities.38 Almost three 
decades later, the Supreme Court had to decide Re Canada Assistance 
Plan,39 a constitutional challenge (by way of a reference launched by the 
government of British Columbia) to unilateral federal changes to the 
terms of the CAP that limited annual growth in the federal contribution 
to five per cent for “have” provinces (Ontario, Alberta and British 
                                                                                                                       
rejected, see Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 
(S.C.C.), and discussion in remainder of this section. Although perhaps still legally debatable, the 
practical and political validity of the federal spending power is affirmed by, for instance, its specific 
mention in the Canadian Agreement - A Framework to Improve the Social Union for Canadians, 
online: <http://www.scics.gc.ca/english/conferences.asp?a=viewdocument&id=638>. 
35  For an argument as to why a spending power should be at least somewhat limited, see 
Andrew Petter, “Federalism and the Myth of the Federal Spending Power” (1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 
448. For analysis of the broader issue of federal jurisdiction over social policy, see Sujit Choudhry, 
“Recasting Social Canada: A Reconsideration of Federal Jurisdiction over Social Policy” (2002) 
52:3 University of Toronto L.J. 163-252. 
36  Keith G. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Kingston & Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982), at 48. 
37  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-1 [rep.]. For an overview of the Canada Assistance Plan Act and the 
nature of the agreements entered into under it (as well as the Social Union Framework Agreement 
that superseded it) see Barbara Cameron, “Accounting for Rights and Money in the Canadian Social 
Union” [hereinafter “Cameron”] in Margot Young, Susan B. Boyd, Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day 
(eds.), Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, Legal Activism (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2007), ch. 8 [hereinafter “Young, ‘Poverty’”]. 
38  See Canada Assistance Plan Act, id., at s. 6(2)(a). See also Finlay v. Canada (Minister of 
Finance), [1986] S.C.J. No. 73, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.), where the citizen-enforceability of this 
aspect of the agreement was considered. 
39  Reference re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 60, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
525(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Re Canada Assistance Plan”]. 
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Columbia), thus eroding the 50/50 split. The main focus of the challenge 
was an objection to the unilateral nature of the federal government’s 
actions. The government of British Columbia, joined by other provinces, 
argued that no amendments to the CAP could occur without provincial 
consent. In the course of the reference, the province of Manitoba raised 
an argument that appeared to dispute the power of the federal 
government to intrude into provincial jurisdiction via conditional grants 
under the spending power. This argument was directly rejected by 
Sopinka J. for the unanimous Court.40 
The judicial validation of a federal spending power that can be used 
in areas of provincial legislative jurisdiction is an example of the more 
specific facilitative role of constitutional law in relation to socio-
economic inequality. The social assistance programs funded via the CAP 
can be regarded as governmental actions that promote or improve 
substantive equality. Fundamentally, social assistance programs 
acknowledge differential socio-economic circumstances and, in 
particular, social and economic disadvantage and injustice. Through the 
creation of programs providing benefits targeted to needs, social 
assistance programs involve differential legal treatment (not everyone 
meets the legal criteria for receiving assistance) aimed at ameliorating 
differential social circumstances. In addition, in the subsequent case of 
Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), the Supreme Court held that 
individual Canadians were entitled to bring a court action to enforce the 
CAP condition of setting benefits at a level that takes into account basic 
necessities. In this way, constitutional law facilitates a means of citizen 
accountability for the terms of inter-governmental cost-contribution 
agreements that relate to substantive equality. 
At the same time though, in Re Canada Assistance Plan, the Court 
validated the federal government’s liberty to unilaterally alter the terms 
of the agreement, in part based on the fundamental constitutional 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty that limits the power of a present 
Parliament to bind a future Parliament. By validating this governmental 
liberty in circumstances that involved an erosion of an agreement that 
supported substantive equality, the Court restrained the ability of 
constitutional law to go beyond facilitating to protecting substantive 
equality. In a few short years, the federal government eliminated the 
CAP altogether, replacing it with new agreements that significantly 
                                                                                                                       
40  Id., at 567. By the same token, the Court has recognized a similar scope for provincial 
spending power, see Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.). 
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reduced the federal share of social program expenditures.41 The price of 
provincial acceptance of these agreements was a loosening or 
abandonment of the federal conditions, including the “basic necessities” 
reference point, that, in turn, enabled some provinces to pursue drastic 
cutbacks in levels of social assistance. In Ontario, for example, the Harris 
government reduced social assistance rates by 22.6 per cent.42 This cut 
had devastating consequences for individuals in receipt of social 
assistance and significantly increased socio-economic inequality.43 The 
unwillingness of the courts to allow the Charter-based area of 
constitutional law to be used to protect the socio-economically 
disadvantaged from these consequences will be considered below.44 
Along the way, with the move to largely unconditional transfers, Finlay’s 
hard won entitlement to hold governments accountable to the terms of 
their cost-sharing arrangements became meaningless. 
2.  Separation of Powers 
The facilitative role of constitutional law in relation to social justice 
is also evident in the area of the separation of powers between the 
constitutionally defined branches of government  legislature, 
executive/administration and judiciary. Concerns about maintaining an 
appropriate separation of powers arise in two main contexts: first, in the 
context of governmental initiatives aimed at deploying the apparatus of 
the administrative state to improve access to justice in key areas of social 
justice and socio-economic inequality; and, second, in the context of 
Charter-based judicial scrutiny of governmental action in relation to 
socio-economic inequality. In this section I will focus on the first 
context, leaving the second context to section 4, below. In addition, in 
this section, I will discuss the recent confirmation that constitutional law 
on the separation of powers can play a protective role in relation to 
substantive equality in the sense that the constitutional establishment of 
the judicial branch has been held to necessitate a measure of protection 
for access to justice.  
                                                                                                                       
41  For a discussion of the dismantling of CAP and transition to new arrangements, see 
Cameron, supra, note 37 and Lorne Sossin, “Salvaging the Welfare State: The Prospects for Judicial 
Review of the Canada Health & Social Transfer” (1998) 21 Dalhousie L.J. 141. 
42  Ian Morrison, “Ontario Works: A Preliminary Assessment” (1998) 13 J. L. Soc. Pol’y 1, at 5. 
43  Id. 
44  See section III.4, below. 
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After a rocky start, the facilitative role of constitutional law in the 
context of administrative state deployment in social justice areas now 
seems well entrenched. The key constitutional issue has been to prevent 
the improper transfer of power from the judicial branch of government, 
which is established by section 96 of the Constitution Act 1867, to the 
executive/administrative branch in general and to administrative 
tribunals more specifically. This issue has arisen in relation to the 
establishment and operation of a variety of administrative tribunals in a 
number of different social policy areas of special significance for social 
justice and socio-economic inequality. This includes residential tenancy 
disputes and cases in that area have established some of the basics of 
constitutional law on the issue. In the area of residential tenancies, which 
is generally representative of the aims and methods of administrative 
state deployment,45 all provinces have for some time had legislation that 
regulates residential tenancy relationships.46 In general, this legislation 
affects both the substantive terms of residential leases and the process by 
which disputes are resolved. Substantively, the legislation revises or 
replaces relevant common law principles and doctrines, emanating from 
property and contract law. The objective of doing so has been, at least in 
part, to ameliorate the substantive inequality that can exist between 
landlords and tenants, some of which is bolstered by traditional common 
law rules.47 Procedurally, the legislation substitutes an administrative 
decision-maker and/or tribunal for the regular courts, with the objective 
being to provide a more “informal, effective, expeditious and 
inexpensive”48 process that improves access to justice. This multi-
pronged objective is achieved, at least in part, by means of establishing a 
dispute resolution process that is more expert in residential tenancy 
issues and less constrained by traditional common law approaches (or 
ideologies). Typically, the regular courts retain a degree of jurisdiction 
that enables them to undertake some supervision of the decisions of the 
tribunals, but the role of the courts is significantly reduced. In other 
words, both substantively and procedurally, the powers of the judicial 
                                                                                                                       
45  For an overview of the aims and methods of the administrative state, especially in relation to 
displacement of courts and the common law, see W.A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of 
Litigation and the Social and Political Life of Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
46  Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17; Residential Tenancy Act, S.B.C. 2002, 
c. 78; Civil Code of Québec, CCQ-1991. 
47  For an overview of the genesis and substance of residential tenancy law reform, see B. 
Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2000), at 276-82. 
48  Id., at 277. 
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branch of government are being significantly re-allocated to an organ of 
the executive/administrative branch. 
The judicial consideration of the issue of whether this particular re-
allocation of powers violated the constitutional separation of powers got 
off to a rocky start with the Supreme Court’s decision in Reference re: 
Residential Tenancies Act 1979 (Ontario).49 The case arose as a reference 
by the provincial government as a preliminary step to the introduction of a 
new residential tenancy regime in Ontario. With its decision, the Supreme 
Court both initiated a constitutional test for re-allocations of power from 
courts to administrative tribunals and found that the regime planned in 
Ontario would violate that test. The Court laid down a three-part test for 
constitutionality that required examination of: whether the re-allocated 
powers had historically been exclusively exercised by the province’s 
superior courts; whether the powers were judicial in nature; and, whether 
the new institutional context had transformed the nature of the powers in 
any way that might save the re-allocation as being regarded as upsetting 
the traditional allocation of powers.50 In the circumstances of the reference, 
the Court held that the re-allocation of certain powers  to make orders 
evicting tenants and to make orders to compel compliance with rent 
control requirements  failed all three parts. By the Court’s own admission, 
this result went somewhat against the grain of preceding decisions that 
had generally sanctioned investing administrative tribunals with judicial 
functions. Moreover, the Court explicitly acknowledged the aim of 
improving both substantive and procedural justice in residential tenancy 
matters. Perhaps tellingly though, Dickson J., who wrote on behalf of the 
Court, noted that representatives of both tenants and landlords objected to 
the transfer of power.51 
Given this result, constitutional law on the separation of powers had 
the potential to stand in the way of a significant element of administrative 
state deployment in the interests of substantive equality. But this potential 
was relatively quickly quarantined and, within 15 years, all but deflated. 
Only two years later, the Supreme Court gave constitutional approval to a 
new residential tenancy regime in Quebec, ostensibly on the grounds that, 
historically, the relevant powers were not exclusively exercised by the 
superior courts in that province but, rather, had been shared with provincial 
                                                                                                                       
49  [1981] S.C.J. No. 57, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (S.C.C.). 
50  Id., at 734. 
51  Id., at 749. 
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courts.52 Six years after that, the Court, by majority, put a “gloss” on the 
historical inquiry required under the first step by positing that the inquiry 
should examine the relative exclusivity of jurisdiction at a national level, 
at the time of Confederation.53 Finally, a further 10 years later, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of revisions to the residential tenancies 
regime in Nova Scotia that involved powers similar to those that were the 
focus in Ontario.54 While this decision was enabled by an adoption of the 
national perspective on the historical inquiry, it also appeared to involve 
a reappraisal of the historical record even in Ontario. In the period 
between the decisions on the Ontario and Nova Scotia references, 
Ontario had continued to legislatively revise the substantive terms of 
residential tenancy relationships, but dispute resolution was left in the 
hand of the courts. Following the Nova Scotia reference decision, the 
Ontario government established a new administrative tribunal system for 
residential tenancy disputes.55  
What looked like a rocky start to the constitutionality of the re-
allocation of powers relating to residential tenancy disputes now looks 
more like a rough patch in a longer term evolution of constitutional law  
under the separation of powers  that has generally facilitated deployment 
of administrative state apparatus to address substantive inequality.  
Turning to the protective role of constitutional law on the separation of 
powers, the Supreme Court, by majority, has recently confirmed that in 
establishing the judicial branch of government and, more specifically, the 
courts of superior jurisdiction, the Constitution necessarily protects access 
to those courts.56 On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the provincial 
power to make laws for the administration of justice in the provinces 
(under section 92(14)) could not impose hearing fees on parties to 
litigation if those fees operated to deny access to the superior courts.57 
While this did not mean that hearing fees were necessarily 
unconstitutional, it did mean that a hearing fee scheme needed to ensure 
that it did not prevent any individual litigants from utilizing the superior 
courts. In the particular case, the hearing fee scheme implemented in 
                                                                                                                       
52  See Quebec (Attorney General) v. Grondin, [1983] S.C.J. No. 78, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 364 (S.C.C.). 
53  See Yeomans v. Sobeys Stores Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 13, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 238, at para. 27 
(S.C.C.). 
54  See Reference re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act (N.S.), [1996] S.C.J. 
No. 13, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186 (S.C.C.). 
55  This came via the Tenant Protection Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 24. 
56  Trial Lawyers Assn. of British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2014] 
S.C.J. No. 59, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Trial Lawyers”]. 
57  Id., at para. 77. 
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British Columbia was struck down because, although it allowed trial 
judges to waive the fee for litigants who were in receipt of certain 
specified social assistance benefits or who were “indigent” or “otherwise 
impoverished”, the scope of this discretion was regarded as too narrow. 
This decision thus sees constitutional law on the separation of powers 
playing a protective role in the sense that it will not allow provincial 
governments to impose additional burdens on would-be litigants in ways 
that exacerbate the negative consequences of existing socio-economic 
inequality in relation to the affordability of access to the courts. In 
reasoning to this result, the majority in the Supreme Court also invoked the 
constitutional principle of the rule of law. In the next section I discuss the 
role of this constitutional principle in relation to substantive equality and 
access to justice in contexts that do not involve the separation of powers. 
3.  Fundamental Principles 
Constitutional law recognizes a set of constitutional principles that 
play a limited role in defining the demands of constitutional law. The 
principles recognized so far are: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism 
and the rule of law, respect for minorities, and judicial independence.58 
The principle of the rule of law has the most immediate relevance to 
substantive equality. Before it was invoked by the Supreme Court in a 
reinforcing role, in relation to protecting litigants from barriers to access 
to justice created by hearing fees in the British Columbia litigation, the 
rule of law principle had been directly relied upon to similar effect by 
lower courts in other provinces.59 The Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
directly relied upon the principle to deem a hearing fee scheme in that 
province unconstitutional.60 Similarly, the Ontario Divisional Court had 
required that other types of prescribed court fees could also be found 
unconstitutional, for violation of the rule of law principle, if they failed 
                                                                                                                       
58  Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 49 
(S.C.C.); Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 83 (S.C.C.). 
59  For a broader discussion of this aspect of the rule of law principle, see Kerri A. Froc, “Is 
the Rule of Law the Golden Rule? Accessing ‘Justice’ for Canada’s Poor” (2008) 87 Can. Bar Rev. 
459 [hereinafter “Froc”]. 
60  Pleau v. Nova Scotia (Supreme Court, Prothonotary), [1998] N.S.J. No. 526, 186 N.S.R. 
(2d) 1 (N.S.S.C.). 
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to provide for discretion to waive the fees in the interests of access to 
justice.61  
The protective role of the rule of law principle evident in these cases 
on access to justice and court fees is, however, relatively limited and the 
courts have so far generally refused to allow it to play a more expansive 
protective role. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected a claim, 
based on the rule of law principle, that sought to protect people with low 
incomes, who needed legal services, from the negative impact on their 
access to justice of a tax on legal services introduced by the British 
Columbia government.62 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Canada refused 
leave to appeal from lower court decisions dismissing a claim brought by 
the British Columbia branch of the Canadian Bar Association seeking, in 
part, a reversal of cuts to legal aid services in the province on the basis 
that the cuts worsened barriers to justice and so violated the rule of law 
principle.63 It is important to note though that, in each of these instances, 
the dismissal was framed in ways that left open the possibility of claims 
oriented to similar ends succeeding in the future.64 
4.  Rights and Freedoms 
Constitutional law under the Charter has a mixed record in terms of 
facilitating and furthering substantive equality in the socio-economic 
sphere. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long maintained that the 
                                                                                                                       
61  Polewsky v. Home Hardware Stores Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 2908, 66 O.R. (3d) 600 (Ont. 
Div. Ct.). 
62  British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, [2007] S.C.J. No. 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 
873, 2007 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Christie”]. 
63  Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2015, 2006 BCSC 1342, 59 
B.C.L.R. (4th) 38 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2008] B.C.J. No. 350, 2008 BCCA 92, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 617 
(B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 185 [hereinafter “CBA”]. 
64  In Christie, supra, note 62, the trial judge had upheld the claim but a majority of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned that decision. As the claim journeyed up the court 
hierarchy, it was incrementally re-characterized, by the judiciary, to be less focused on the particular 
detrimental impact on low income people. Since it was the re-characterized claim that was rejected, 
this leaves the door open to the possibility of a different result in a future claim that is more narrowly 
focused, provided that focus can be maintained. For a deeper analysis consistent with this point, see 
Froc, supra, note 59. In the CBA case, id., the decisions to dismiss focused on the lack of standing of 
the CBA, rather than the lack of merit to the claim, although the question of standing revolved 
around the substantive issue of whether there was a serious issue to be tried. A key stumbling block 
for establishing the seriousness of the issue was, according to the courts, the generalized nature of 
the claim. This leaves the door open to the possibility of a different result in a future claim that is 
framed more specifically. 
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Charter guarantees not merely formal but also substantive equality.65 In 
addition, in an early Charter case it was stated that the section 1 
guarantee clause was imbued with the following values that need to be 
considered when applying the Charter itself: “respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, 
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and 
group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance 
the participation of individuals and groups in society”.66 In combination, 
these positions would appear to hold significant potential for 
constitutional law to validate claims against governmental action that 
diminishes substantive equality and governmental inaction that fails to 
improve substantive equality.67 Beyond that, the Supreme Court has 
confirmed that the guarantee of substantive equality is consistent with the 
introduction of ameliorative programs aimed at and restricted to 
disadvantaged groups, even where they entail drawing legal distinctions 
that involve differential treatment on protected grounds.68 Moreover, 
Canadian courts have shown some willingness to revise rules on 
litigation standing and costs to acknowledge and ameliorate substantive 
inequality in the capacity of socio-economically disadvantaged 
individuals and groups to bring forward legal claims under the Charter.69 
On the other hand, however, governments have strongly resisted 
attempts to have the Charter applied in ways that would either protect 
already existing substantive equality measures or require measures to 
improve substantive equality. For their part, and in terms of the ultimate 
result in cases, Canadian courts have tended to take the governments’ 
side and so the Charter has rarely prevented governmental measures 
                                                                                                                       
65  See, for instance: Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695, at para. 
229 (S.C.C.); Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para. 18 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at 
para. 16 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, [2013] 
1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 36 (S.C.C.). 
66  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at para. 64 (S.C.C.). 
67  This potential is consistent with the expectations for s. 15 that were held by the civil 
society who engaged its design and drafting, see Porter, supra, note 4. 
68  See Kapp, supra, note 65. For an analysis of this case and area, which includes some 
compelling arguments that substantive equality requires much more from the Supreme Court’s 
approach to ameliorative measures, see Young, “Kapp’ing”, supra, note 4. 
69  See, for instance: Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United 
Against Violence Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524, at para. 71 (S.C.C.); Adams, 
supra, note 17; British Columbia/Yukon Assn. of Drug War Survivors v. Abbotsford (City), [2015] 
B.C.J. No. 733, 37 M.P.L.R. (5th) 12, 2015 BCCA 142, at para. 31 (B.C.C.A.). But there are 
counterpoints to these issues as well: CBA, supra, note 63; B.C. Trial Lawyers, supra, note 56. 
584 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
diminishing substantive equality, and has not compelled significant 
improvements in substantive equality.70 At the same time though, the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning has laid doctrinal stepping stones that 
provide possibilities for progress in protecting or promoting substantive 
equality in the future. Moreover, the prospects for realizing these 
possibilities may be strengthened by reasoning in some recent cases in 
which the Supreme Court has reversed itself on significant rights claims 
due, in part, to concerns about substantive socio-economic inequality. 
The most direct claims to protection or improvement in relation to 
socio-economic disadvantage and substantive equality are based on 
either the section 7 guarantee that no person can be deprived of life, 
liberty or security of the person except in accordance with fundamental 
justice or the section 15 guarantee of equality before and under the law, 
as well as of equal protection and benefit of law. Claims that are less 
directly aimed at specific substantive equality measures, but that have 
broader relevance for socio-economic inequality, can be advanced under 
other Charter provisions. In particular, the section 2 guarantee of 
freedom of association has been relied upon in attempts to protect and 
promote workers’ rights in relation to collective bargaining and the right 
to strike.  
In terms of the most direct claims, the two leading examples of the 
Supreme Court protecting or requiring substantive equality measures are 
its decisions in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General)71 and 
New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.).72 
The Eldridge case raised the general question of whether a universally 
provided social program  in this case, public health care services  
needed to be provided on a basis that ensured equal access for persons 
with disabilities via a claim that deaf patients were entitled to a re-
instatement of medical translation services. The Supreme Court upheld 
the claim, under section 15, on the general ground that, without the 
translation services, deaf patients would not receive equal benefit of the 
universally provided health care system. The provision of the translation 
services can be regarded as a substantive equality measure, that is, a 
measure that responds to differential disadvantage in life circumstances 
that is caused by or corresponds to the protected ground of disability. 
Therefore, the decision in Eldridge is an example of constitutional law 
                                                                                                                       
70  For a recent overview and critique, see Young, “Social Justice”, supra, note 4. 
71  [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eldridge”]. 
72  [1999] S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “G. (J.)”]. 
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requiring a substantive equality measure. In the G. (J.) case, the Supreme 
Court upheld a claim that section 7 required that a custodial parent living 
on low income, who could not afford to retain legal counsel for child 
protection proceedings, had to be provided with state-funded counsel.73 
The entitlement to state-funded counsel in these circumstances was a 
response to the relative socio-economic disadvantage of people living on 
low income and so can also be regarded as an instance of constitutional 
law requiring a substantive equality measure. 
In addition, substantive equality has been protected and promoted in 
some lower court decisions.74 An example is the decision in Adams,75 
which upheld a Charter challenge to the impact on people experiencing 
street homelessness of a municipal by-law that prohibited the overnight 
erection of temporary shelters in public parks. This decision accepted 
that the prohibition exacerbated the risks to life and security of the 
person that street homelessness already posed and thus enabled the 
claimants to invoke the protection offered by section 7. 
Unfortunately, viewed as part of the broader landscape of 
constitutional law under the Charter, Eldridge, G. (J.) and Adams appear 
as relatively isolated moments of support for substantive equality, at least 
in terms of results. Although the decisions retain important 
jurisprudential validity and force, they are outnumbered by the instances 
in which Charter claims seeking to protect or require substantive equality 
measures have been rejected. Rejected claims include, for instance: a 
claim to protection against a reduction of over 20 per cent in social 
assistance rates;76 a claim to protection against a conditional reduction in 
social assistance to unemployed younger adults;77 a claim to protection 
against withdrawal of essential utility services for inability to pay a 
security deposit;78 a claim to provision of therapeutic services for 
                                                                                                                       
73  For a deeper and broader consideration of this case and its aftermath, see Kate Kehoe & 
David Wiseman, “Reclaiming a Contextualized Approach to the Right to State-Funded Counsel in 
Child Protection Cases” (2012) 63 University of New Brunswick L.J. 163. 
74  See discussion in Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, “Rights-Based Strategies to Address 
Homelessness and Poverty in Canada: The Charter Framework” in Martha Jackman and 
Bruce Porter, eds., Advancing Social Rights in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at 81-95. 
75  Supra, note 17. 
76  Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), [1996] O.J. No. 363, 134 
D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter “Masse”]. 
77  Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin”]. 
78  Clark v. Peterborough Utilities Commission, [1995] O.J. No. 1743, 24 O.R. (3d) 7, (Ont. 
Gen. Div.). 
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children with disabilities to enable improved capacity to participate in 
society in general;79 and, a claim to protection against anti-panhandling 
laws.80 In some of these instances the rejection of the claim has been 
primarily based on purported inadequacies in the evidentiary support for 
the claims and so there remains a possibility for future progress.81 But in 
other instances the scope of the relevant Charter rights have been said to 
exclude the particular substantive equality claim. In still other instances 
though, where the results and aspects of the supporting reasoning have 
gone counter to substantive equality, the reasoning has included other 
aspects that are potentially promising doctrinal steps. 
An example is the decision in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General)82 that also addressed the public health care system. In Chaoulli 
it was held, by all six members of the Supreme Court who addressed the 
issue, that the Charter did not require the provision of a public health 
care system. At the same time though, they all accepted that, so long as a 
public health care system was provided, the Charter applied to it. More 
specifically, they all also agreed that the risks to life and security of the 
person posed by the combination of undue waiting times for service in 
the public system and limitations on the availability of private care, via 
constraints on private health insurance, fell within the protective scope of 
section 7. Where the judges disagreed with each other was on whether 
the regulatory framework giving rise to these risks to life and security of 
the person could be regarded as violating principles of fundamental 
justice. Three of the six judges found an unjustifiable violation of section 7 
and ultimately the result went that way when a similar conclusion was 
reached by a fourth judge who applied only the (similar) guarantees 
found in the Quebec Charter. This result thus upheld a challenge by a 
relatively socio-economically advantaged claimant to a legislative 
measure designed to restrict the ability of a private market for health care 
services to undermine the effectiveness of the public health care system. 
In that sense, the result undermines more than protects or promotes 
substantive equality.83 Moreover, the judicial position that constitutional 
law under the Charter would not require a broad substantive equality 
                                                                                                                       
79  Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 71, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.). 
80  R. v. Banks, [2001] O.J. No. 3219, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 340 (Ont. C.J.). 
81  For example, Gosselin, supra, note 77. 
82  [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. 
83  The specific measure at issue in Chaoulli was one that prohibited private health insurance 
for services covered by the public system. 
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program, such as public health care, is troubling. This underlying lack of 
protection or compulsion at the program level reflects the positions taken 
in other cases with respect to other types of substantive equality-oriented 
social programs, such as social assistance and legal aid.84 On the other 
hand though, in recognizing that the operation and impact of the public 
health care system can be subject to Charter scrutiny under section 7, a 
doctrinal stepping stone was laid for the possibility of future progress on 
health-care related claims brought by people experiencing substantive 
inequality. 
To some extent this record casts doubt upon the Supreme Court’s 
basic principle that the Charter guarantees not merely formal but also 
substantive equality. At a minimum, this record suggests that substantive 
equality may only impose requirements on governments once they elect 
to introduce measures to ameliorate socio-economic disadvantage. 
Moreover, any requirements of substantive equality may not be allowed 
to reach far beyond the framework of Eldridge and so would be quite 
weak. A troubling sign of the potentially weak force of substantive 
equality under the Charter is the decision of the Court of Appeal of Nova 
Scotia that rejected a Charter challenge to legislated provisions that were 
interpreted as preventing the province’s monopoly provider of electricity 
services from establishing differential service rates for reasons of 
substantive inequality (i.e., charging relatively less to customers with a 
relatively lower ability to pay).85 Even if it might be reasonable to take 
                                                                                                                       
84  On social assistance, see Masse, supra, note 76. On legal aid, note that the courts generally 
refuse to take the position that legal aid is required, although they retain the right to stay any 
proceedings where a lack of legal aid could render a trial unfair or otherwise violate s. 7 of the 
Charter: see, for example, R. v. Prosper, [1994] S.C.J. No. 72, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Rushlow, [2009] O.J. No. 2335, 96 O.R. (3d) 302, 2009 ONCA 461 (Ont. C.A.). One counterpoint to 
this general refusal to hold that the Charter requires particular programs is provided by the Supreme 
Court’s decision to overturn the federal government’s refusal to renew a regulatory exemption that 
permitted the creation and operation of a safe injection and drug treatment facility and program in 
Vancouver, see: PHS, supra, note 32. Canadian courts have also gone to some strange lengths to avoid 
relying upon ss. 7 and 15 to provide protection from cutbacks to social programs. For example, in 
Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] F.C.J. No. 679, 2014 FC 
651 (F.C.) (under appeal to the F.C.A.), the Federal Court held that the cancellation of health care 
services to refugee claimants violated the Charter primarily by violating the s. 12 guarantee against 
cruel and unusual treatment, although it also held that s. 15 had been violated, but not s. 7. 
85  Boulter v. Nova Scotia Power Inc., [2009] N.S.J. No. 64, 275 N.S.R. (2d) 214, 2009 
NSCA 17 (N.S.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 172 (S.C.C.). For a 
description and analysis of this claim and the circumstances behind it, see Claire MacNeil & Vincent 
Calderhead, “Access to Energy: How Form Overtook Substance and Disempowered the Poor in 
Nova Scotia” in Martha Jackman and Bruce Porter, eds., Advancing Social Rights in Canada, 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at 253. 
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the position that the Charter’s guarantee of substantive equality does not 
require differential service rates in order to ameliorate substantive 
inequality, it is very difficult to see how it can tolerate a legislative 
provision that pre-emptively prohibits consideration of whether 
substantive inequality ought to be taken into account. It should be noted 
though that the Supreme Court has at least been careful to enable 
provincial anti-discrimination human rights codes to advance a notion of 
substantive equality that is consistent with the Eldridge framework. For 
example, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the British Columbia 
Human Right Tribunal that required the government of British Columbia 
to reinstate the therapeutic services made available to children with 
disabilities seeking to participate in the public education system.86  
In terms of the less direct claims to substantive equality that rely upon 
the section 2 guarantee of freedom of expression, constitutional law under 
the Charter has done an about-face on the issues of whether the section 
provides protection for the right to strike and to collectively bargain.87 
Although those rights have now been held to be protected, the Supreme 
Court has suggested that the protections may be more procedural than 
substantive, at least with respect to collective bargaining.88 Moreover, and 
more disturbingly from the perspective of substantive equality, although 
the Supreme Court has disapproved the wide-ranging denial of freedom of 
association rights to agricultural workers89  some of the most socio-
economically disadvantaged employees  it has nevertheless approved 
their ongoing exclusion from the regular system of labour relations and 
                                                                                                                       
86  Moore v. British Columbia (Education), [2012] S.C.J. No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 
(S.C.C.). More broadly, the endorsement of the Supreme Court is seen as important because it has 
been argued that statutory human rights tribunals tend to advance a more robust notion of 
substantive equality, which may end up informing the Supreme Court’s own approach. For a 
discussion of this interplay, see Bruce Ryder, “The Strange Double Life of Canadian Equality 
Rights” in B.L. Berger, J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2012 (2013) 63 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 261. 
87  Labour Trilogy: Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 
S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] 
S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. 
Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.). The about-face is represented by, 
on protection of the right to strike, Saskatchewan, supra, note 1 and, on protection of collective 
bargaining, Health Services and Support  Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 
Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, 2007 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) and Mounted Police 
Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2015 
SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mounted Police Association of Ontario”]. 
88  Health Services and Support  Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British 
Columbia, id. 
89  Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.). 
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their relegation to a regulatory regime with relatively minimalist “good 
faith” protections.90 This situation exists despite the explicit reliance on 
Anatole France’s aphorism in the recent Supreme Court decision that 
constituted the judicial about-face on Charter protection for the right to 
strike.91 Specifically, Abella J. cited the aphorism in the course of rejecting 
the minority view that, as Her Honour saw it, attributed equivalence 
between the power of employees and employers. According to Abella J., 
the minority view “turns labour relations on its head, and ignores the 
fundamental power imbalance which the entire history of modern labour 
relations legislation has been scrupulously devoted to rectifying”.92 On the 
one hand, this invocation of the need to be vigilant about substantive 
inequality sits awkwardly with the endorsement of lesser rights for 
agricultural workers. On the other hand, that a concern for substantive 
inequality played a role in the decision to reverse the exclusion of 
significant labour rights from the Charter offers hope for future substantive 
equality claims in labour and other socio-economic contexts. 
Charter-based constitutional law thus has a mixed record on 
substantive equality and socio-economic inequality. The Charter has 
generally been allowed to play a facilitative role, consistent with other 
areas of constitutional law, in the sense that it has not been allowed to be 
used to block substantive equality measures,93 although Chaoulli has 
raised some concerns about that. At the same time though, the Charter 
has rarely required substantive equality measures and the courts have 
regularly refused to allow it to provide protection from measures that 
diminish substantive equality in the socio-economic realm. Nevertheless, 
it is worth emphasizing that the accumulated constitutional doctrine 
contains potentially useful stepping stones for more positive progress on 
substantive equality claims in the future. Those stepping stones include:  
 
                                                                                                                       
90  Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
91  Saskatchewan, supra, note 1. 
92  Id., at para. 56. In a subsequent rejoinder, one of the minority judges (Rothstein J.), noted 
that the majority’s decisions offered a greater degree of protection to already relatively advantaged 
groups of workers  public servants and police officers (see Mounted Police Association of 
Ontario, supra, note 87, at para. 240). 
93  Per Dickson J.: “In interpreting and applying the Charter I believe that the courts must be 
cautious to ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll 
back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition of less advantaged 
persons”, R. v. Edward Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 136 
(S.C.C.). 
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the recognition of a right of patients who are deaf to assistive services for 
communication with medical practitioners (Eldridge); the recognition of 
a right to state-funded counsel in child protection matters (G. (J.)); the 
recognition of the detrimental impact of a prohibition on erecting 
temporary shelters on the rights to life and security of the person of 
people who are street homeless (Adams); and the recognition of the 
relationship between timely access to public medical services and the 
rights to life and security of the person (Chaoulli). The mixed record thus 
far though is particularly concerning for the future of constitutional law 
and substantive equality because the Charter is the part of constitutional 
law that is most directly designed and empowered to regulate the policy 
choices that governments make with respect to citizens. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a thorough analysis 
of the reasons for the unwillingness of the courts and governments to 
support a greater role for the Charter in protecting and requiring 
substantive equality but the main determining factors can be easily 
enough drawn from accumulated Charter scholarship. For present 
purposes, the reasons for the Charter’s mixed record can be grouped 
under three main categories that are mutually-influencing and 
reinforcing: doctrinal, institutional and ideological. Doctrinally, 
governments and the courts have often adopted conceptions of particular 
rights and freedoms, and associated legal concepts and principles, that 
are inherently or contingently limited in their ability to acknowledge and 
enable substantive equality. A key example of this is the use of 
comparator group analysis in section 15 equality jurisprudence.94 
Another example is the conception of “deprivation” under section 7 as 
entailing a taking away, rather than a failure to provide,95 as well as the 
preference for a predominantly civil and political, rather than social and 
economic, understanding of the scope of circumstances that can threaten 
“life, liberty and security of the person”.96 Institutionally, governments 
                                                                                                                       
94  See: Daphne Gilbert, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada Dooms 
Section 15” (2006) 24:1 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 111; Margot Young, “Social Justice 
and the Charter: Comparison and Choice” (2013) 50:3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 669. 
95  Contrasting interpretations of “deprivation” are evident in Gosselin, supra, note 77, in 
the judgments of McLachlin C.J.C. (at para. 81, suggesting limitation to a taking away) and Arbour 
J. (at para. 321, arguing can also include withholding). See also, Alison M. Latimer, “A Positive 
Future for Section 7? Children and Charter Change” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 537, at 539 and 
Martha Jackman, “Charter Remedies for Socio-Economic Rights Violations: Sleeping Under a 
Box?” in Kent Roach & Robert J. Sharpe eds., Taking Remedies Seriously (Montreal: Canadian 
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2010), at 281-85. 
96  Hogg, supra, note 29, at para. 44.8. 
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have been hostile to, and the courts have been wary of, the democratic 
legitimacy and policy-making competence of judicial intervention in 
law-making in areas of social regulation that implicate Charter rights and 
freedoms.97 This hostility and wariness has generally operated to reduce 
the scope of judicial interpretation and enforcement of Charter rights and 
freedoms and, moreover, that narrowing effect has been applied 
disproportionately in relation to claims impugning social and economic 
policy making.98 Finally, ideologically, since around the time of the 
introduction of the Charter, Canadian governments, not to mention others 
throughout the Western world, have gradually weakened their 
commitment to, if they have not turned decidedly against, the ideals of 
the social welfare state, including socio-economic equality.99 Canadian 
courts have, to say the least, not resisted this ideological shift and appear 
generally ambivalent about lending their doctrinal and institutional 
power to defending or promoting socio-economic equality and 
distributive justice.100 Some Canadian judges, in some cases and in some 
extra-judicial speeches, express sympathy for the plight of the socio-
economically disadvantaged, but that has rarely translated into a 
courtroom victory.101  
                                                                                                                       
97  For an overview of the distinction between legitimacy and competency oriented 
arguments, as well as an analysis of the role of the latter, see David Wiseman, “Competence 
Concerns in Charter Adjudication: Countering the Anti-Poverty Incompetence Argument” (2006) 51 
McGill L.J. 503 [hereinafter “Wiseman, ‘Competence Concerns’”] and David Wiseman, “Managing 
the Burden of Doubt: Social Science Evidence, Institutional Competence of Courts and the Prospects 
for Anti-poverty Charter Claims” (2014) 33 N.J.C.L. 1 [hereinafter “Wiseman, ‘Burden of Doubt’”]. 
See also Hester A. Lessard, “Dollars Versus [Equality] Rights: Money and the Limits on Distributive 
Justice” in J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. 299 [hereinafter “Lessard”]. 
98  See Wiseman, id. 
99  For a discussion of the relationship between the rise of neo-liberalism, welfare reform and 
notions of social citizenship, with a particular focus on Ontario, see: Janet Mosher, “Welfare Reform and 
the Re-Making of the Model Citizen” in its role in Margot Young et al., eds., Poverty: Rights, Social 
Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007). 
100  See Joel Bakan, Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997); Andrew Petter, “Wealthcare: The Politics of the Charter Revisited” in The 
Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010); Lessard, supra, note 97. 
101  For example, MacLachlin C.J.C. expressed sympathy for the claimant in her judgment in 
Gosselin, while rejecting her claim. In the same case, Arbour J. was a lone voice in support of 
constitutionalizing protections for social welfare rights. 
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5.  Aboriginal Rights: Section 35 
The relationship between constitutional law and social justice for the 
First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples of Canada is predominantly 
characterized by the failure of constitutional law to impede a long history 
of colonial and neo-colonial governmental action that has created and 
exacerbated both formal and substantive inequality.102 Indeed, the 
Canadian constitutional order is founded upon an assertion of 
sovereignty over Aboriginal Peoples that is increasingly recognized as 
lacking legal and political legitimacy,103 and yet Canadian constitutional 
law has generally been unwilling to confront that problem. Moreover, 
and until recently, constitutional law has tolerated systemic disregard for 
historic treaties with, and other key undertakings to, Aboriginal Peoples 
and, in this sense, has acted as a willing facilitator of the social injustice 
that disproportionately characterizes the situation of many Aboriginal 
communities and people.104  
It was hoped that Canadian constitutional law might be able to chart 
a different course with the embedding, as part of the constitutional 
renewal of 1982, of the section 35 declaration that “existing aboriginal 
and treaty rights” would be “recognized and affirmed”.105 The meaning 
and significance of section 35 remains very much a work-in-progress. 
                                                                                                                       
102  The history of colonialism is amply documented in Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Volume 1: Looking Forward, 
Looking Back (Canada Communication Group: Ottawa, 1996), particularly c. 6 “Stage Three: 
Displacement and Assimilation” at 130. The contemporary substantive inequality of Aboriginal people 
is attested to in, for example, David Macdonald & Daniel Wilson, Poverty or Prosperity: Indigenous 
children in Canada (Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives; Ottawa, 2013), online: 
<https://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/poverty-or-prosperity>. This publication reports 
that Indigenous children are over two and a half times more likely to live in poverty than non-
Indigenous children. 
103  John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002), in particular c. 5, “Questioning Canada’s Title to Land: The Rule of 
Law, Aboriginal Peoples, and Colonialism”; B. Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the 
Crown” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433 at 437; Michael Asch, “From Terra Nullius to Affirmation: 
Reconciling Aboriginal Rights with the Canadian Constitution” (2002) 17:2 C.J.L.S. 23. 
104  In numerous cases the Supreme Court has held that general provincial laws that operate 
to restrict or prohibit traditional and treaty-based Aboriginal hunting rights are allowed to have that 
effect under the federal Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 and the associated exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over Indians (s. 92(24)). In so doing, the Supreme Court has typically dismissed or 
ignored arguments that treaty rights should be accorded more protection and a higher constitutional 
status. See, for instance, R. v. Sikyea, [1964] S.C.J. No. 42, [1964] S.C.R. 642 (S.C.C.) and  
R. v. George, [1966] S.C.J. No. 7, [1966] S.C.R. 267 (S.C.C.). Prior to the entrenchment of s. 35 of 
the Constitution, it was accepted that federal legislation could extinguish treaty rights: see Hogg, 
supra, note 29, at 27.5(e). 
105  Constitution, s. 35. 
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At particular points in time, the potential for positive impact on socio-
economic inequality for Aboriginal Peoples and the trajectory of decisions 
and doctrine in section 35 cases have been assessed optimistically and 
pessimistically.106 Rather than survey the ups and downs of what is already 
a sizeable body of jurisprudence, in this section I will briefly discuss the 
extent to which constitutional law under section 35 has been formulated  
to acknowledge and accommodate the already existing socio-economic 
inequality of those individuals and communities whose rights it articulates 
and whose negotiations and litigations over those rights it purports to 
facilitate. 
An example of a lack of acknowledgment and accommodation of 
already existing socio-economic inequality is the judicial formulation of 
Aboriginal title and the associated encouragement to negotiate rather 
than litigate the underlying issues. As formulated in Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia,107 Aboriginal title is subject to both an inherent 
limitation and to justified infringement. The inherent limitation is that the 
title lands cannot be utilized by the holders of Aboriginal title in ways 
that are “irreconcilable with the nature of the [prior] occupation of that 
land and the relationship that the particular group has had with the 
land”.108 In addition, governments are entitled to infringe on Aboriginal 
title to advance a wide array of public policy objectives, provided the 
infringements are not disproportionate to the objectives and that they 
comply with associated obligations to consult and compensate. Having 
formulated Aboriginal title in this way, the Supreme Court concluded 
with an encouragement to negotiate, rather than litigate, Aboriginal title 
claims. The establishment of a constitutional right to Aboriginal title 
under section 35 is a development that has significant potential to 
improve substantive equality for Aboriginal Peoples. Yet the terms of its 
formulation and the encouragement to negotiate can be criticized for 
failing to acknowledge or accommodate already existing socio-economic 
inequality. Specifically, in formulating the inherent limit, the Supreme 
Court appears to constrain the Aboriginal title-holders to land-uses that 
are reconcilable with the nature of the relationship they had to the land at 
                                                                                                                       
106  For example, see Darlene Johnston, “Lo, How Sparrow Has Fallen: A Retrospective of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s Section 35 Jurisprudence” in Julia Bass, William A. Bogart & 
Frederick H. Zemans, eds., Access to Justice for a New Century – The Way Forward (Toronto: Law 
Society of Upper Canada, 2005). 
107  [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]. 
108  Id., at para. 128, per Lamer C.J.C. 
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a time when they were autonomous and sustainable communities not yet 
subjected to the substantive inequality wrought by colonialism. To 
prohibit uses of land that may have been inconceivable in the past, but 
that are appropriate and feasible for a contemporary Aboriginal 
community that is experiencing significant socio-economic disadvantage, 
may doom the community to perpetual substantive inequality. 
Admittedly, an Aboriginal community caught in this bind always has the 
option of surrendering the land to the government on terms that would 
enable it to undertake uses that would violate the inherent limit, but that 
leads to another problematic aspect of the Delgamuukw decision. 
Specifically, whether negotiating the terms of a surrender to circumvent 
the inherent limit, or negotiating the terms of a proposed infringement of 
Aboriginal title, or negotiating the settlement of an Aboriginal title claim, 
an inequality of bargaining capacity may arise for Aboriginal 
communities that are already experiencing circumstances of socio-
economic disadvantage. Moreover, by formulating Aboriginal title in a 
way that seeks to offer internal mechanisms for balancing Aboriginal and 
governmental interests  that is, the mechanisms of the inherent limit 
and justified infringement  the Supreme Court undermines the 
bargaining position of Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal communities 
might have had a much stronger bargaining position if Aboriginal title 
had been formulated without internal limitations, thereby necessitating 
that governments bargain not merely over how to balance the respective 
interests but also for the opportunity to balance interests at all. Given the 
socio-economic disadvantage of many Aboriginal communities, it could 
be expected that there would ultimately be mutual interest in balancing, 
but the Aboriginal communities would be starting with a stronger 
bargaining position that could help them to both compensate for any 
relative disadvantage in bargaining capacity and to reach a deal that 
better ameliorates their broader socio-economic inequality.  
Some concerns can thus be raised about the extent to which the 
foundational decision of constitutional law on Aboriginal title 
acknowledges and accommodates the existing socio-economic inequality 
of Aboriginal Peoples. On the other hand, and at the other end of the 
spectrum of acknowledgment and accommodation, Canadian courts  
have established a doctrinal basis for Aboriginal claimants to seek 
advanced costs and other cost-sharing and cost-subsidizing arrangements 
with the governments against whom they are bringing claims under 
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section 35.109 In the middle of the spectrum are developing approaches to 
the impact of socio-economic inequality on the capacity of Aboriginal 
communities to participate in processes associated with the constitutionally 
imposed duty on governments to consult on any measures that may impact 
on rights protected by section 35.110 
Overall then, the relationship between constitutional law and substantive 
equality for Aboriginal Peoples is currently emerging from a long history of 
colonialism. The associated dispossession and discrimination, which was 
both tolerated and facilitated by constitutional law, has wrought the worst 
circumstances of socio-economic inequality in contemporary Canada. The 
relatively recent constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal title and rights 
under section 35 potentially allows constitutional law to make amends by 
establishing and protecting those entitlements in ways that will lead to 
improvements in substantive equality for Aboriginal Peoples. But there are 
already signs of an inconsistent appreciation for the relevance of existing 
socio-economic inequality. 
6.  Other Constitutional Provisions and Constitutional Values 
Another constitutional provision that has the potential to play a role in 
relation to ameliorating socio-economic inequality is section 36. This section 
commits the federal and provincial governments to: “(a) promoting equal 
opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; (b) furthering economic 
development to reduce disparity in opportunities and (c) providing essential 
public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians”. Since equal 
opportunity for well-being and the provision of essential public services 
can both be understood as relevant to protecting and advancing 
substantive equality, there is potential for either level of government, or 
individuals, to invoke this provision when governmental action appears 
inconsistent with these constitutional commitments. Thus far, however, 
section 36 has rarely been invoked and, to the limited extent that it has 
                                                                                                                       
109  See British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, [2003] S.C.J. No. 
76, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, 2003 SCC 71, at paras. 27-31 (S.C.C.). See also: Brian McLaughlin, Cheryl 
Tobias & Craig Cameron, “Interim Costs: The Impact of Okanagan Indian Band” (2005) 54 
U.N.B.L.J. 126. 
110  See Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 
3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.). On capacity-building funding generally, see Dwight G. 
Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich 
Publishing Ltd., 2009), at 38, 73. 
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been judicially considered, there have been mixed views on whether it is 
capable of giving rise to enforceable obligations.111 
Even though section 36 might not be directly enforceable, it could 
still play a role if regarded as a relevant source of constitutional values 
that could inform the broader development of constitutional law. This 
would be akin to the role that Charter values have been allowed to play 
in the development of the common law in disputes between private 
parties. As I will now briefly discuss, the role of Charter values in 
disputes between private parties is a final way in which constitutional 
law has been relevant to social justice. An example is the recognition that 
the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of expression gives rise to an important 
corresponding Charter value that needed to be considered when the courts 
were reviewing the application of the common law on tortious interference 
with contracting to a situation of secondary picketing associated with a 
labour dispute.112 While each specific Charter right and freedom would 
therefore seem to establish a Charter value relevant to the common law, it 
is also the case that the Charter values recognized as imbued in the section 1 
guarantee clause  including the value of “social justice and equality”  
could be relevant to development of the common law as well.113 
In sum then, looking back, in a variety of legal areas, constitutional 
law has generally been willing to facilitate governmental action aimed at 
improving substantive equality. Very occasionally, under the Charter, it 
has gone further than facilitating by requiring substantive equality 
measures. More regularly though, under the Charter, constitutional law 
has refused to protect or mandate substantive equality in relation to 
socio-economic inequality and social injustice. Nevertheless, even where 
courts have rejected substantive equality oriented Charter claims, their 
reasoning has either left the door open to or laid some stepping stones for 
future progress. One way to interpret the overall trajectory of the past of 
                                                                                                                       
111  For a view that s. 36 might create enforceable rights, see Manitoba Keewatinowi 
Okimakanak Inc. v. Manitoba Hydro-Electric Board, [1992] M.J. No. 218, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 554, at 
para. 10 (Man. C.A.). For a view that it does not, see CBA, supra, note 63, at para. 118, per Brenner 
C.J.S.C. For a broader discussion of this issue, see Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter, “Rights-Based 
Strategies to Address Homelessness and Poverty in Canada: The Constitutional Framework” (2013-10) 
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Working Paper Series at 11-19, online: <http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2348724>. 
112  Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada 
Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.). 
113  For a judicial effort to enlist Charter values in adding a substantive equality dimension to 
the common law conception of trespass as applied to public property, see R. v. A. (S.), [2011] A.J. 
No. 986, 52 Alta. L.R. (5th) 85, 2011 ABPC 269 (Alta. Prov. Ct.). 
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constitutional law in relation to social justice is to say that it has been 
characterized both by a gradual acceptance of the importance of 
substantive equality and by a very cautious, and not always forward 
moving, approach to steering constitutional law to that end. In the next 
section, I consider an element of Charter jurisprudence that may be 
relevant to determining whether constitutional law will head more, or 
less, in the direction of the realization of socio-economic equality over 
the next few decades. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: MOVING 
FORWARD (UNDER THE CHARTER) 
The relationship between constitutional law under the Charter and 
social justice reflects the trajectory of the past of constitutional law more 
generally. In pronouncing the dictates of the Charter, Canadian courts 
have generally refused to allow it to block governmental measures aimed 
at addressing substantive inequality. At the same time though, they have 
only sometimes enabled the Charter to protect or require substantive 
equality in the face of governmental retrenchment or inaction. This 
despite a recognition, at least on the part of the Supreme Court’s now 
long-serving Chief Justice, that the expansive wording of the Charter’s 
equality guarantee was meant as an encouragement to meaningful 
judicial action.114 When understood in terms of the mixed record of the 
Charter in relation to socio-economic inequality, it can be said that, at 
least in terms of realization, the constitutional conception of equality is 
more majestic than substantive. While some steps towards substantive 
equality have been taken, and some stepping stones for the future have 
been laid, overall progress has been restrained and cautious.  
A certain level of restraint and caution in the judicial expression of 
constitutional law under the Charter is, in a constitutional democracy, 
probably as it should be. The Charter enables courts to overrule the products 
of an electorally-accountable governing institution and there are good 
reasons to be skeptical about the desirability, legitimacy and capacity of too 
                                                                                                                       
114  In extra-judicial writing on the challenges that Canadian judges have faced in giving 
meaning to the Charter’s equality guarantee, McLachlin C.J.C. stated that the expansive wording of 
the guarantee was the framers’ means of giving “the courts clear, unequivocal instructions: This is a 
guarantee of equality. Take it seriously. Don’t cut it down. Interpret it in a meaningful and expansive 
way.” See The Right Honourable B. McLachlin, P.C., “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 
14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17, at 17. 
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great a role for government-by-courts.115 Moreover, in the broader context of 
national and global social, economic, technological and political forces, the 
impact of constitutional law and adjudication under the Charter to drive 
change may be quite limited overall, even if there are also some moments of 
special significance.116 Nevertheless, the Charter has its own democratic 
pedigree and the courts have long constituted an essential element of 
systems of democratic governance. The issue for judicial expression of 
constitutional law under the Charter is therefore not so much whether the 
courts should overrule governments in defence of constitutional rights and 
freedoms but, rather, when and to what degree they should do so.117 To the 
extent that seeking to protect and advance a constitutional conception of 
substantive equality is accepted as a touchstone for when and to what degree 
courts should intervene under the Charter, the question arises of how to steer 
constitutional law in that direction. In my view, whether meaningful 
progress can be made in that direction will depend upon the willingness of 
the courts to undertake a multi-dimensional shift in their approach to the 
Charter. The shift needs to take place across the doctrinal, institutional and 
ideological dimensions of Charter adjudication. In this section I will identify 
and discuss one potential area for change that implicates all of these 
dimensions, namely, the approach to the problem of polycentricity or, to 
phrase it more simply, the problem of social policy complexity. 
An argument commonly invoked by governments and courts in 
rejecting claims seeking to protect or require substantive equality measures 
in the socio-economic realm is that such measures are typically but  
one aspect of a broader and multifaceted social policy engagement that 
involves a complex web of interactions among an array of regulatory 
programs and measures. As such, the design and operation of any one 
measure will be connected to the design and operation of a network of other 
measures. Adjustments to one specific measure will have implications and 
reverberations across at least part of the broader network of measures within 
                                                                                                                       
115  For expressions of concern about government-by-courts, see Andrew Petter, The Politics 
of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2010); Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: 
Thomson Educational Publishing, Inc., 1994); Janet Heibert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of 
Judicial Review (Montreal & Kingston: McGill Queen’s University Press, 1996). 
116  See W.A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the Social and 
Political Life of Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994). See also Harry W. Arthurs, 
“Governing the Canadian State: The Constitution in an Era of Globalization, Neo-Liberalism, 
Populism, De-centralization and Judicial Activism” (2003) 13 Constitutional Forum 60. 
117  Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001). 
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which it is situated. In legal scholarship, and in Charter case law, this has at 
times been referred to as the problem of “polycentricity”, which reference 
draws on the work of Lon Fuller who identified polycentric situations as 
posing challenges for adjudicative decision-making processes.118 More 
commonly, scholars, legal advocates and judges use the more simple 
nomenclature of social policy complexity.119 Complexity of this sort is 
seen as a “problem” because it makes it difficult to separately investigate 
the effect of any one measure or to understand and analyze the impact of 
adjusting just one measure. In the context of Charter adjudication, this 
means that it is difficult to assess the extent to which an alleged violation 
of rights or freedoms can be attributed to any one measure. As well, it is 
difficult to assess whether adjusting any one measure will necessarily 
produce a better result for relevant rights and freedoms, either for the 
immediate claimant or for others who might be impacted as the broader 
system reacts to the particular adjustment. In a nutshell, the existence of 
complexity highlights the artificiality of focusing Charter scrutiny on a 
single governmental action (or inaction), because many governmental 
actions (and inactions) are undertaken as part of a broader collection of 
actions.  
Government lawyers have regularly raised the problem of social 
policy complexity as a basis for urging Canadian courts to hold that 
particular claims, especially in relation to substantive equality measures, 
ought to be held to be injusticiable (that is, not within the scope of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter) or, if violations are 
found, ought to be held to a lower, more deferential standard of scrutiny 
under section 1. Canadian courts have often accepted these arguments 
and, in doing so, have acquiesced in an interlocking set of doctrinal, 
                                                                                                                       
118  See Lon L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harvard Law Rev. 
353. For a discussion of the idea and impact of polycentricity in social rights adjudication in general, 
see J. King, “The Pervasiveness of Polycentricity”, Public Law (2008) 101-24. The term 
“polycentricity” was first referred to in Charter case law in M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 3, per Bastarache J. at para. 310 (S.C.C.). The term was referred to somewhat earlier in an 
administrative law context in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at para. 36 (S.C.C.). 
119  An example of a scholar referring to the problems posed by “complex policy issues” is 
provided by Christopher P. Manfredi, “Déjà vu All Over Again: Chaoulli and the Limits of Judicial 
Policy-making” in Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, Access to Care, Access to 
Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2005), at 140. For a recent judicial example, see Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of 
Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at paras. 35, 37, 53 and 56 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]. 
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institutional and ideological positions that, although highly contestable, 
and sometimes judicially questioned, continue to exert explicit or implicit 
influence in Charter adjudication.120 The doctrinal position is that  
the traditional focus of constitutional human rights laws, and cases, is 
singular governmental legal “attacks” or intrusions on the formal 
equality (and negative liberty) of citizens.121 As singular events, these 
legal actions can be impugned and assessed on their own terms and 
without much attention to broader legal context, let alone broader social 
context. The corollary of this position is that action or inaction that 
diminishes or fails to improve substantive equality (or positive liberty) of 
citizens are more likely to be excluded from the scope of Charter scrutiny 
or, if included, are more likely to receive a lower degree of Charter 
regulation. The institutional reinforcement for this position comes 
through an argument that, as compared to democratically elected 
legislatures, and their associated governmental policy-making processes, 
the courts, in conducting Charter review, are comparatively less 
competent in complex/polycentric policy areas and comparatively less 
legitimate in non-traditional areas of human rights.122 Finally, the 
ideological reinforcement exists in the libertarian/neo-liberal hostility to 
the social welfare state, to social and economic human rights, to 
substantive equality, to positive liberty (and so on), as well as 
stigmatization and stereotyping of people from historically 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, including those living on low 
income or in receipt of social assistance.123 To the extent that these 
ideological tendencies inform the prevailing political winds, they can 
easily blow into Charter adjudication and decision-making, especially if 
                                                                                                                       
120  See Wiseman, supra, note 97. 
121  This doctrinal position has been expressed in the supposed distinction, oft-repeated by 
Canadian judges, between individual-antagonizing criminal justice measures and group-mediating 
social policy measures. Reliance on this distinction has waxed and waned. It was utilized in, for 
instance, McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.), 
disavowed in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 
S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), but then invoked in Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 119. For discussion of the 
distinction, and its incoherence, as well as its apparent revival, see Wiseman, “Competence 
Concerns” and “Burden of Doubt”, supra, note 97. 
122  For discussion of this argument, see Wiseman, supra, note 97. 
123  See Martha Jackman, “Reality Checks: Presuming Innocence and Proving Guilt in 
Charter Welfare Cases”, D. Pothier “But It’s For Your Own Good”, D. Schneiderman, “Social 
Rights and ‘Common Sense’: Gosselin through a Media Lens” in Young, “Poverty”, supra, note 37; 
Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Céline Bellot, “Challenging Discriminatory and Punitive Responses to 
Homelessness in Canada” in Martha Jackman and Bruce Porter, eds., Advancing Social Rights in 
Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014). 
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it is the case, as has been argued, that judges are prone to social and 
political conservatism.124 
The point I want to make about the invocation of the problem of 
complexity in Charter adjudication is not so much that the problem does not 
exist or is not of real significance. Although I have argued elsewhere, and 
still maintain, that governments and courts tend to overstate the problem, 
and tend to over-react to it, especially in social rights cases, that is not to 
argue that there is not a real problem to be grappled with.125 Rather, my 
point is that the response to the problem needs to be re-thought, at least if 
there is going to be much hope for constitutional law to protect or advance 
substantive equality. The prevailing response of governments and courts to 
the problem of complexity is, as I have outlined, to deny or dilute the scope 
or degree of Charter protection offered to substantive equality claims that 
impugn specific governmental actions (or inactions) that are complex. 
One strategy pursued by substantive equality claimants and advocates 
has been to offer an alternative framework for adjudication of substantive 
equality issues under the Charter. This alternative framework focuses 
attention on the overall ends or outcomes, rather than any one specific 
means, of governmental action in complex policy-making areas. The 
purpose of offering this alternative framework is to enable courts to assess 
whether the overall ends or outcomes are achieving the realization of 
substantive equality, without needing to attribute deficiencies to any one 
particular measure. In addition, this framework would enable courts to 
identify and declare when action is needed to protect or improve substantive 
equality, while leaving it to governments to determine which adjustments, to 
one or more policy measures, will best achieve the required results. In this 
way, the alternative framework enables the courts to avoid the pitfalls of 
intervening in polycentric situations.  
This alternative framework is evident in a substantive equality-
oriented Charter case that has recently been before the courts but was 
                                                                                                                       
124  Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997) in particular c. 7, “Judges and Dominant Ideology”, at 103-17. 
125  See, Wiseman, supra, note 97. That the recognition of and response to the problem of 
complexity/polycentricity is skewed against substantive equality claims is evident in the apparent 
willingness of the courts to overlook or overcome the problem in two recent decisions involving the 
obviously complex situations of prostitution (Bedford  although sex-workers do tend to be socio-
economically disadvantaged, this was not the prime focus of the case) and physician-assisted suicide 
(Carter  in this case, some attention was given to the substantive inequality argument that only 
socio-economically advantaged people could avoid the domestic prohibition on physician-assisted 
suicide by travelling to other international jurisdictions with no such prohibition). 
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dismissed at the very threshold of Charter adjudication. The case, 
Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General),126 involved a claim that the 
harms and inequalities afflicting individuals experiencing homelessness 
and inadequate housing represent a failure of the Canadian and Ontario 
governments to implement effective strategies to ensure realization of the 
rights protected by sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. The claim was 
explicitly aimed at prompting systemic change to improve the outcomes 
of governmental action in relation to the life circumstances of people 
experiencing homelessness and inadequate housing and so, in general 
terms, aimed to improve substantive equality in the socio-economic 
realm. A key remedy being sought was an order that the respective levels 
of government must develop and implement an “effective national and 
provincial strategy to reduce and eliminate homelessness and inadequate 
housing”.127 As such, the claim in Tanudjaja offered the courts a 
framework for applying the Charter to complex circumstances of social 
injustice without artificially isolating one aspect of governmental action 
or requiring an impossible level of judicial expertise in assessing the 
adjustments that would need to be made to ensure the relevant rights and 
freedoms were realized. The Tanudjaja framework achieves this by, first, 
allowing a court to hold that it is the prevailing circumstances of 
homelessness and inadequate housing, rather than any particular 
governmental measure causing them, that constitute the rights violations. 
Next, the Tanudjaja framework allows a court to rely on either the 
apparent arbitrariness and disproportionality of these circumstances, or 
the absence of a national strategy that might demonstrably justify them, 
or both, to refuse to excuse the violations under section 1. Finally, the 
Tanudjaja framework allows a court to adopt a remedial approach  
ordering the development and implementation of a national strategy  
that acknowledges and respects the social policy complexity and the 
policy-making expertise of governments.  
                                                                                                                       
126  Tanudjaja, Arsenault, Mahmood, Dubourdieu and the Centre for Equality Rights in 
Accommodation v. Canada (Attorney General) and Ontario (Attorney General), Court File  
No. CV-10-403688. A motion to dismiss was heard and upheld by the Superior Court, see: 
Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] O.J. No. 4078, 116 O.R. (3d) 574, 2013 ONSC 
5410 (Ont. S.C.J.). That ruling was upheld by a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 5689, 123 O.R. (3d) 161, 2014 ONCA 852 
(Ont. C.A.). An application for leave to appeal has recently been dismissed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 39 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tanudjaja”]. 
127  Notice of Application (Tanudjaja v. Canada (Attorney General), Court File No. CV-10-
403688), at 3. This and other court documents for the case are available online: 
<http://socialrightscura.ca/eng/legal-strategies.html#charter-challenge>. 
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Despite constructively offering this alternative framework for 
acknowledging and managing the complexity of social policy in relation to 
homelessness and adequate housing, the Tanudjaja claim was met with stiff 
opposition from the respondent governments who brought motions to have 
the action summarily dismissed for want of a reasonable cause of action. 
The motion was accepted by the Ontario Superior Court and that decision 
was upheld by a majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal (with the Supreme 
Court of Canada refusing to grant leave to appeal). The crux of the argument 
as to why there was no reasonable cause of action was the failure of the 
claimants to direct their challenge at one particular governmental measure. 
The judicial willingness to dismiss the Tanudjaja claim at the very 
threshold of Charter adjudication leaves claims to substantive equality 
trapped between a rock and a hard place. On the one side of the trap  the 
rock  governments and courts invoke the problem of complexity in order 
to short circuit judicial scrutiny under the Charter. When claimants impugn 
a withdrawal of, or failure to provide, a substantive equality measure, 
governments point to the complex context of the measure to caution the 
courts against any or much Charter scrutiny. However, on the other side of 
the trap  the hard place  when claimants attempt to respond to the 
problem of complexity by impugning not specific measures, but overall 
outcomes, as in Tanudjaja, governments insist that the targeting of a 
specific measure is a necessary pre-requisite of a valid Charter claim.128  
For present purposes I am not going to engage the doctrinal debate 
around whether the courts ought to accept the arguments that create the 
rock or the hard place.129 Rather, my purpose is to highlight the 
                                                                                                                       
128  Governments also argue that it is necessary to base a claim on a factual record that 
identifies specific individual claimants whose experience of rights violations can be adequately 
documented. A failure to do this was part of the reason that an outcome-oriented systemic challenge 
to inadequacy of legal aid in British Columbia was dismissed for want of a reasonable cause of 
action a few years before Tanudjaja was launched, see Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2006] B.C.J. No. 2015, 59 B.C.L.R. (4th) 38, 2006 BCSC 1342(B.C.S.C.) and [2008] B.C.J. No. 
350, 2008 BCCA 92, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 617 (B.C.C.A.). The Tanudjaja claim is based, in part, on the 
experiences of identified individuals/applicants and so avoids falling foul of this hurdle. Leaving this 
difference aside, the Canadian Bar Association was caught by precisely the same trap in that the 
government respondents argued that, on the one hand, the claim did not challenge any one specific 
legislative measure affecting legal aid but also that, on the other hand, to the extent that the claim 
might be challenging one specific measure, it was artificially isolating that measure from its 
polycentric context. See: Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, Statement of Defence (British 
Columbia), para. 8, online: <https://www.cba.org/CBA/Advocacy/pdf/statement_crown.pdf>. 
129  I have elsewhere more fully analyzed the role of concerns about polycentricity/complexity in 
judicial conceptions of the institutional competence of courts, along with other concerns, and the issue of 
how to respond to them, see: Wiseman, supra, note 97. 
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implications that maintaining the rock/hard-place trap has for the future 
of constitutional law in relation to socio-economic inequality. If Charter 
claims aimed at protecting or advancing substantive equality remain 
trapped between the rock and the hard place that I have described, then 
constitutional law will ultimately be unable to play anything but a 
facilitative role in efforts to address socio-economic inequality and social 
injustice. If government arguments on the problem of complexity prevail, 
then the Charter, and the courts, will be shut out of the social and 
political debate about socio-economic inequality and social injustice. As 
mere facilitators, their only role will be to get the Charter, and 
constitutional law more generally, out of the way of equality-enhancing 
measures. Although it may be undesirable for constitutional law to aspire 
to a leadership role on advancing substantive equality, it may also be 
undesirable to relegate it to a merely facilitative role. Constitutional law 
ought to at least be able to nudge governments either away from 
retrenchments in substantive equality or towards advancements in 
substantive equality  or to reinforce the efforts of others in society as 
they attempt to nudge governments. Over the longer term, it may be 
important for constitutional law to maintain a position in support of 
protecting and advancing substantive equality.  
In order to allow constitutional law to play a meaningful role in 
protecting and advancing substantive equality, a choice must be made 
about which side of the rock/hard-place trap to chip away. In my view, 
since the problem of complexity should not be entirely dismissed or 
ignored, it would be best to choose to soften the hard place by allowing 
and developing or, at least, exploring, an alternative framework for 
substantive equality claims, such as put forward in Tanudjaja.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Over the past three decades or more, constitutional law has 
predominantly played a facilitating role in the improvement of social 
justice and substantive equality in Canada. When Canadian governments 
have taken action to ameliorate socio-economic inequality, Canadian 
courts have generally cleared potential constitutional law roadblocks. At 
the same time though, Canadian courts have only rarely erected any 
barriers to governmental action that has exacerbated socio-economic 
inequality. Although Canadian constitutional law, particularly under the 
Charter, purports not to be constrained to a merely formal conception of 
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equality, it has often refused invitations to protect and advance 
substantive equality. This is not to deny that constitutional law has taken 
some important steps towards substantive equality, nor to ignore that 
some significant stepping stones for the future have been laid. But, 
overall, progress has been, at best, restrained and cautious.  
The restrained and cautious approach of constitutional law to 
protecting and advancing substantive socio-economic equality stands in 
contrast to the persistence of significant income deprivation and a steady 
growth in income inequality. The detrimental impacts of poverty and 
income inequality are far outstripping any beneficial impact of 
constitutional law. This reality suggests that the constitutional conception 
of equality is, to date, more majestic than substantive. While it may be 
ill-advised, in a democracy, to seek judicial leadership on protecting and 
advancing substantive equality, it ill-befits constitutional law in general, 
and the Charter in particular, for courts to simply follow along as 
governmental policy choices exacerbate and entrench significant 
deprivation and inequality. Indeed, as it becomes increasingly recognized 
that social trust and participation are eroded by income inequality, an 
overly restrained and cautious judicial approach to substantive equality 
ill-befits democracy itself. And yet Canadian courts are in danger of 
being caught in a jurisprudential trap that threatens to curtail, if not undo, 
the modest support for substantive equality they have shown so far. If 
Charter adjudication is so trapped, not only would constitutional law and 
democracy be vulnerable to further erosion, but so too would be the 
opportunity that the Charter potentially provides to people living on low-
income and experiencing socio-economic inequality to take issue with 
the governmental policy choices that frame their circumstances. In my 
view, the best way to avoid this trap is to explore new approaches to 
acknowledging and managing the social policy complexity that confronts 
courts when adjudicating substantive equality-oriented claims. If it 
proceeds that way, the future of constitutional law and social justice has 
the potential to more meaningfully contribute to advancing substantive 
over majestic equality. 
 
